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Personal Identity and Head Transplant:
A Psychological Analysis
Giulia Avvenuti, IMT School for Advanced Studies
Personal identity as intended by embodied cognition theo-
ries is deeply challenged. If the sense of selfhood is main-
tained through the reciprocal dialogue between our
cognition, which depends upon the experiences we do by
way of the body, and our body, whose sensorimotor capac-
ities are unique and embedded in our broader bio-psycho-
logical context, what could be the impact of the head
transplant on personal identity? In other words, the body
is our coherent way to be in the world and experience it,
and cognition is the mean through which we transcend
our body and become involved in the world recognizing
ourselves as an “I,” knowing that different sensations and
feelings—ways of being—belong to the same individual, a
signifying totality. Hence, who will be the HEAVEN-GEM-
INI survivor? Should we reconsider the notion of personal
identity? How can we deal with the potential cosmetic
purpose of this procedure? The feasibility and success of
the head transplant depend also on the preservation of the
integrity of personal identity and the sense of selfhood,
which should be a fundamental goal of research, right next
to concerns about the technical aspects. As health care pro-
fessionals and researchers, we must look into psychologi-
cal well-being as well as physical well-being.
As technological and medical knowledge advances, it
comes as no surprise that surgical procedures for body-to-
head transplantation (BHT) have been under investigation
over the past few years. The medical team led by the Italian
neurosurgeon Sergio Canavero proposed the HEAVEN
(head anastomosis venture; Canavero 2013) and GEMINI
(spinal cord fusion; Canavero and Ren 2016) protocols—two
procedures that should assure the successful transplantation
of a healthy brain (body-recipient, the head) on a brain-
dead body (body-donor). The team of doctors had sched-
uled the first head transplant to be performed in a human
for the end of 2017, which turned out to be an optimistic
prediction, considering the safety and feasibility issues
related to the two procedures stemming from the uncertain
and premature results of clinical trials in animal models.
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In addition to the medical issues that such a procedure
can obscure, but that are not the focus of this commentary,
many ethical concerns have arisen from both the scientific
community (Brennum 2016, Furr et al. 2017) and the gen-
eral public. The already known concerns, related to organ
transplantation in general, largely involve an attempt to
minimize risks and optimize benefits. Indeed, even if the
potential benefits of a BHT are striking—think of a quadri-
plegic patient, for whom medicine is currently powerless,
who could achieve standing position and gait, and thus
autonomy and a better quality of life—the risk of serious
damages including death is too high.
However, the new and crucial challenge arising from
the head transplantation is related to neurocognitive
aspects and the nature of personal identity: Who will be
the HEAVEN–GEMINI survivor? The “head-owner,” the
“body-owner,” or a new individual?
EMBODIED COGNITION THEORIES AND PERSONAL
IDENTITY
Before examining the relationship between head trans-
plantation and personal identity integrity, we should dis-
ambiguate the meaning of three concepts often used
interchangeably: personhood, brainhood, and selfhood.
While personhood in Western culture is the status, the
condition of being an individual who is alive, aware, has
feelings, has cognitive abilities, and controls his own
behavior, brainhood is a concept belonging to neuroscien-
tific research. According to Vidal (2009), what makes a
human being an individual is the property of being a brain,
which has its own ways of functioning and its contents. In
this perspective, identity and the brain are the same thing
and thus the individual, now turned into a cerebral subject,
depends on the integrity of brain function.
According to the hermeneutic–phenomenological per-
spective that I will consider, selfhood refers to the way in
which every individual is present to himself and prereflex-
ively conscious of his actions, thoughts, and feelings in
everyday life and engaging with others. In other words,
selfhood refers to the ability of a person to always recog-
nize herself as the same individual, with the characteristics
of continuity, unity, and privacy, and consistently with her
ways of being in the world. If some scholars still argue that
personal identity depends on psychological continuity—
the continuity of one’s own memories, thoughts, emotions,
feelings—others claim that it is provided by biological-
bodily continuity—based on the complex interrelation
between external inputs, regulatory systems, and patterns
of perception (Pascalev, Pascalev, and Giordano 2016;
Mori 2016). However, this Cartesian dualism has been
rejected in favor of a new kind of dualism, which neverthe-
less continues to engage the mind–body problem in the
construction of personal identity.
Embodied cognition theories, which have their roots in
Kant’s philosophy and have been recently developed by
philosophers and neurobiologists such as Merleau-Ponty,
Damasio, Varela, and Maturana, state that personal
identity depends strictly on the intrinsic bond between
the cognition of the individual and the body of the individ-
ual. In defining the term embodied, Varela and colleagues
stated:
By using the term embodied we mean to highlight two points:
first that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that
come from having a body with various sensorimotor capaci-
ties, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities
are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological,
psychological and cultural context. (Varela, Rosch, and
Thompson 1992, 172–173)
If the body is our (coherent) way to be in the world, cogni-
tion is the way in which we transcend our body and
become involved in the world through recognizing our-
selves as an “I,” knowing that different experiences and
emotional tones—ways of being—belong to the same indi-
vidual (Me). This continuity, also called permanence of the
Self, is built through the narrative identity:
the narrative recomposition of the experience of living recon-
figures the variety of one’s own experience into a signifying
totality, while concurrently delineating the person to whom
those actions and emotions refer. (Arciero and Bondolfi 2009,
60)
In this perspective, if we take away from a person her
ways of being in the world and her emotional tones—
replacing one’s body with the body of someone else,
likely possible in the near future through the
HEAVEN–GEMINI procedure—what remains is only a
thinking thing, a res cogitans. How could this thinking
thing, the head receiving the body, bind to a new expe-
rience of perceiving the external world? If the brain is
the organ that recognizes sensorial experiences coming
from the body as belonging to Me, and translates
them into meaningful episodes intertwined in a coher-
ent narrative identity, how could a transplant survivor
deal with the mismatch between the identity of the
head and the foreign and unfamiliar identity of the
body? From the psychopathological literature, we know
that the inability to integrate different personal experi-
ences into a coherent narrative reconfiguration often
lead to the emergence of pathology, which may take
different shapes. Should we consider the transplant
survivor as an individual with potential identity
disturbances, unable to recognize himself and his new
experiences?
Interestingly, an attempt to address this issue is the
proposal of an augmented virtual reality training for the
body-recipient prior the surgery, which should prevent
the triggering of dysfunctional behaviors and psychologi-
cal burden that could rise from experiencing a foreign
body (Iamsakul et al. 2017). Even if these kinds of techni-
ques are conventional and effective in neurorehabilitation
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for neurological injuries, as well as for prosthetic limb
implant, dealing with a body completely new in size,
shape, and even sex and age may not be just a matter of
some sessions of training and can be overwhelming for the
individual identity in any case. In fact, external dimensions
of the body, such as size and shape, and other body parts
like hands, legs, eyes, mouth, and sexual organs appear to
be fundamental for personal identity, whereas our inner
organs, even of crucial importance for our life, do not con-
tribute to the outer perceived identity. Even though these
criteria are in part culture-based and may depend also on
personal beliefs, it is undeniable that corporeity—the being
embodied, “the same each and every time, in the same
things with the same emotional tones” (Arciero and Bon-
dolfi 2009, 71)—contribute to the perception of the same-
ness of my experience, both from a first-person standpoint
and an objective one.
CONCLUSIONS
Even assuming a complete physical recovery after a head
transplant, is it enough to consider the whole procedure
safe for the individual undergoing it? Should we recon-
sider personal identity? Do we have to accept the notion of
(pure) brainhood in order to agree with the HEAVEN–
GEMINI procedure? If there is someone willing to undergo
the procedure, should we consider personal identity defi-
nition as a personal matter? These and other questions
remain open: neither thought experiments nor animal
experiments can tell us anything about this issue. The for-
mer still highlight intricate philosophical and ethical
themes; the latter, although promising, cannot yet rely on
sound experimental procedures through which we can
study consciousness and awareness in animals.&
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Is There a Place for Humility in
HEAVEN?
Anto Cartolovni , Catholic University of Croatia
The primary intention of Ren and Canavero’s article (2017)
is to respond to various criticisms raised by their proposal
of the head anastomosis venture (HEAVEN) procedure.
Before we launch a deeper analysis of Ren and Canavero’s
article, I would like to draw attention to a sentence,
“Unfortunately, humility is not a part of medical lore,”
where they refer to the arrogance and unsuccessfulness of
medical science to recognize the importance and break-
through of the HEAVEN procedure. Interestingly, with
this repeated citation, they acknowledge a familiar criti-
cism of medical lore, so that we would expect that they
provide a good example of the appreciation of humility in
their present article.
However, at the beginning of the article’s abstract, they
call for a sound ethical debate based on equipoise and knowl-
edge, claiming that thus far the debate and considerations are
without a proper grounding in knowledge and science. Fur-
thermore, they wonder about the ethical outrage they have
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